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TRADE RESTRICTIONS, FEDERALISM, AND 
THE JUDICIARY: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 
Lord Mackenzie Stuart* 
COURTS AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE UNITED 
STATES AND EUROPE. Edited by Terrance Sanda/ow and Eric Stein. 
New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press. 1982. Two 
volumes. Pp. xxxix, 600. $39.50 per volume. 
Times, happily, have changed since Alexander Hamilton could write of 
Europe extending her dominion "by her arms and by her negotiations, by 
force and by fraud" and say that "[i]t belongs to us to vindicate the honour 
of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother moderation."1 Eu-
rope has long since acknowledged that in the field of constitutional studies 
it has much to learn from the United States and that the learning process is 
best conducted in an atmosphere of joint endeavor. 
If proof were required it is to be found in these two handsome volumes 
produced with the restrained elegance one associates with the Clarendon 
Press. Their object, as the preface by the editors states, is to describe "the 
roles played by the Supreme Court of the United States and the novel 
Court of Justice of the European Communities in the creation and day-to-
day life of the continent-wide markets on both sides of the Atlantic" (p. xi). 
This intention has been most admirably carried out in practice. The 
individual studies in the work are based on papers prepared for discussion 
at a meeting of European and American judges, scholars, officials, and legal 
practitioners held at Bellagio in July 1979. In general, conference papers 
published "in the raw" are not very appetizing fare. There is often a lack of 
coordination among contributors, unnecessary duplication and distortion of 
emphasis. What is remarkable about Courts and Free Markets is that the 
editors and contributors - the editors themselves being important contrib-
utors - have given to this work its own coherence and unity and have 
thereby significantly advanced our understanding of the problems 
discussed. 
I 
From its inception, the European Community has not lacked its in-
formed observers in the United States. They have drawn on their knowl-
edge of American constitutional law and history to make valuable 
comparisons with their own system. As Professor Stein himself, Professor 
Hay of Illinois, and Professor Waelbroeck of Brussels, have said in their 
* Judge of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. - Ed. 
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 66-67 (A. Hamilton) (H.C. Lodge ed. 1892). 
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magisterial work on the European Communities: ''The American Experi-
ence - its achievements as well as its failures - in building a federal type 
legal framework for a single market of continental proportions is obviously 
relevant to the European effort, and the differences and similarities in tech-
niques are instructive for European as well as American lawyers."2 Or to 
quote Professor Feld and Mr. Slotnick of the University of New Orleans, 
"[t]he similarities are especially striking when one considers the decisions 
rendered by the United States Supreme Court during its formative years, 
which correspond to the first twenty or so years of the fledgling Community 
Court. The work of John Marshall was and is well-known to Community 
Court Justices and consciously or subconsciously may have served as an 
inspiration and perhaps sometimes as a warning."3 
On the other hand, despite the reference just made to the work of John 
Marshall, it has seemed to me that the general practitioner in Europe, be he 
judge or counsel, is largely unaware of the rich seam of American material 
available to him in his own libraries. Such awareness as there has been has 
existed in the university and in a handful of specialists although, among a 
younger generation, there are signs of increasing knowledge and interest 
which the publication of Courts and Free Markets can only assist. 
After an introductory chapter by the editors titled "An Overview" - a 
chapter which merits particular attention - follows a chapter on ''The 
Growth of Central Power, its Incentives and Limitations," viewed from the 
respective standpoints of the United States and the European Communities. 
Similarly structured studies deal with the free movement of goods ( chapter 
III) and the free movement of persons and corporations (chapter IV). "Cen-
tral power control over discriminatory state taxation" is treated as a sepa-
rate topic and the work ends with a chapter entitled "Central Pre-emption 
of State Authority and Related Problems." Inevitably this has led to some 
duplication of material (there are for example no less than seventeen sepa-
rate references to Gibbons v. Ogden4) but this is, if anything, an advantage 
since the several contributors have been left free to develop their material 
as best suits their own requirements. Indeed, it is fascinating to see the vari-
ety of stones hewed from one and the same quarry. 
II 
The theme of the volumes, of course, presupposes an affirmative answer 
to the broad proposition that a useful comparison can be drawn between 
the problems facing the European Court and the Courts of the United 
States respectively and the solutions which they have found. Obviously one 
cannot push the analogy too far. 
In the first place there are the constitutional differences. No court oper-
ates in a vacuum. Its duties and its powers can only be considered against 
the relevant constitution of which the judiciary is only one element. At the 
2. E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROEK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 
IN PERSPECTIVE vii (1976). 
3. Feld & Slotnick, "Marshalling" the European Community Court: A Comparative Study in 
Judicial Integration, 25 EMORY LJ. 317, 354 (1976). 
4. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
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root, then, of any valid comparison between the European Court of Justice 
and the United States Supreme Court there must be the underlying premise 
that the constitutions under which they operate can, at least to some degree, 
be equiparated. To describe the European Community as "quasi-federal" 
both poses and begs the question; yet some such statement is necessary if a 
valid approximation is to be established, since the constitution of the 
United States is not only the oldest but the most classic federal constitution 
in being. 
Part of the difficulty lies in defining the word federal. It means many 
things to many people and in certain political quarters the word arouses 
quite remarkable passion and heat. 
The Community is certainly not a federal state in the American sense. 
As yet the European Parliament has no power of initiating legislation; legis-
lative power is in the hands of institutions not directly answerable to an 
electorate, and there is little or no parallel to the executive power of the 
President. 
But as was said only a few years ago, 
'Federalism' is a much misused word, feared by some as being no more 
than a concentration of power at the centre of a system, an attempt to im-
pose autocratic decision-making over a wide area in opposition to local 
rights and by others as meaning the dissolution of all government. More 
accurately it means the distribution of powers and responsibilities to ap-
propriate political levels and types of institutions, both up and down the 
scale, so as to combine representation and authority, union and diversity, 
organization and freedom. 
. . . If it is accepted that different levels of government are appropriate 
to deal with different aspects of policy making the essence of federalism is 
already there.5 
Nonetheless, in view of the emotion associated with the word federalism 
in certain quarters in Europe, it is perhaps better to avoid it altogether and 
say no more than this: If one is faced with two systems of government - in 
the widest sense of the word - whose operation rests on the assumption 
that to be effective different problems must be treated at different levels, 
there is a basis for comparison irrespective of the label which you attach to 
each system. 
On that limited basis does this assumption apply to both the United 
States and to the European Communities? The answer can only be yes. 
One recalls the well-known statement by the European Court of Justice in 
the leading case of Costa v. E.N.E.L. 6 that "by creating a Community of 
unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own 
legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane 
and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sover-
eignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Mem-
ber States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, 
5. FEDERAL SOLUTIONS TO EUROPEAN ISSUES I, 13 (B. Burrows, G. Denton & G. Edwards 
eds. 1978). 
6. 1964 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 585, (1961-66 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 
~ 8023. 
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and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and 
th ems elves. "7 
There remain nonetheless a number of barriers in the way of making 
too close a comparison. First, there are the structural or institutional differ-
ences. For example, the traditional division of powers into legislative, exec-
utive, and judicial which exists in one form or another in the United States 
and in each of the Member States of the European Community cannot eas-
ily be applied to the fourfold institutional structure of the Community -
the Council, the Commission, the Court, and Parliament. Perhaps one of 
the most striking illustrations is this: Although one speaks in a general way 
of "Community legislation" the EEC Treaty speaks only of "Acts of the 
Council or Acts of the Commission" - thus making no real distinction 
between normative legislation and purely executive decision. 
In the second place, the content of the exclusive power of legislation 
conferred upon Congress - its pre-emptive power as the volumes under 
review would describe it - is very much wider than that conferred upon 
the institutions of the Community. When one takes into consideration also 
the nature and extent of presidential and executive power, may one not ask 
whether this difference is not merely a question of degree but rather one of 
kind? 
In the third place, from a European standpoint, there are the differing 
dimensions of time and territory, factors which, for the reviewer at least, 
must always be kept in mind when making any comparison between the 
work of the federal courts in the United States and the work of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities. 
Take first, time. The United States has been in business for much 
longer than the Community. More than two centuries have elapsed since 
the Declaration of Independence and only thirty years since the signing of 
the Treaty of Paris founding the original Community, the Community of 
Coal and Steel, and only twenty-five years since the signing of the Euro-
pean Economic Treaty. The other factor is territorial. Although the popu-
lation of the enlarged Community is not so different from that of the United 
States, some 260,000,000 as against 214,000,000, in size they are vastly dif-
ferent. Europe of the nine is 1,600,000 square kilometres against the 
9,000,000 of the United States. The United States' Constitution was con-
ceived in terms of thirteen East Coast States, sea-girt for the most part and 
rural in their economy. In the interval the territorial changes were im-
mense. In little more than half a century the thirteen colonies with their 
window on Europe became the immense country we know today stretching 
from the Arctic to the Gulf of Mexico and from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 
The territorial dimension does not end there, of course. One has to 
reckon with the traumatic events of the Civil War and the enormous surge 
of entrepreneurial activity that followed upon it. It is enough to say that the 
7. 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 593, (1961-66 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 8023, at 7385. 
8. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 
U.N.T.S. 143. 
9. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11 (Treaty of Rome). 
1126 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:1122 
eighteenth-century Constitution has had to be changed and interpreted 
afresh to take account of changing circumstances of space and economic 
background. Marshall's observation that the Constitution was "intended to 
endure for ages to come, and, consequently to be adapted to the various 
crises of human affairs"10 has been proved right by events. Changes there 
have been in Europe during the past thirty years certainly, not always for 
the better, but the scale has been wholly different. Thus the difficulties in 
the way of making too close a comparison are twofold. If one pursues the 
analogy of the European endeavor in the past thirty years with the achieve-
ments of the Marshall Court more that 150 years ago the vastly different 
backgrounds must be taken into account. If one seeks to compare present-
day solutions to present-day problems on both sides of the Atlantic one 
does so against, respectively, the short history of the European Communi-
ties and the long experience in the United States of adapting the Constitu-
tion to changing needs. 
It is characteristic of the integrity of Courts and Free Markets that these 
difficulties are faced unflinchingly at the outset. They are stated and ex-
plained by the editors in their opening chapter with skill and point. A simi-
lar and excellent discussion, but from the European angle, is to be found in 
Professor Waelbroeck's closing chapter on pre-emption. Indeed, it is by 
emphasis placed on the differences of institutional structure that Courts and 
Free Markets has frequently something of value to say on both systems. 11 
III. 
It is, however, when one comes to the detailed problems encountered by 
the courts in the United States and by the courts12 in Europe that parallels 
become striking and exciting. One could give many examples, but let three 
10. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
11. To give one example among many, in discussing the differing levels of integration be-
tween the two systems, the editors have this to say: 
Unlike the Congress, the Council currently acts more as a diplomatic conference, in which 
states pursue discrete national interests, than as a co=on institution which decides in the 
co=on interest, if necessary by majority vote. Since negotiations continue until una-
nimity emerges, the decision often reflects the lowest co=on denominator of national 
positions at the lowest level of integration policy. The bargaining process is fraught with a 
distinct risk that states may accept a Treaty violation by one of their own as a quid pro 
quo or in the expectation that their own similar infringement may also receive the blessing 
of the Council. Such compromises would lead to a gradual disintegration of the Common 
Market. It is therefore essential for the Court to check any serious deviation from a rigor-
ous and uniform application of the free trade rules throughout the Community. In the 
United States, the risk of disintegration of the national market, at this stage of the federa-
tion at any rate, is minimal. 
Pp. 31-32. 
12. I say "courts in Europe" in the plural because the extent to which questions of Euro-
pean law, at least in the first instance, come before national courts is not perhaps sufficiently 
realized in the United States. The opportunity for private individuals to bring a case before 
the European Court exercising original jurisdiction (a "direct action") is very limited, whereas 
national courts are always available to hear actions brought to enforce rights under Commu-
nity law. Such cases reach Luxembourg only through the procedure provided for in Article 
177 of the Treaty of Rome, 298 U.N.T.S. at 76, whereby a national judge may obtain a prelim-
inary ruling by the Court of Justice on problems dealing with Co=unity law. In that sense, 
every judge of every court throughout the ten Member States is a Co=unity judge and may 
in that capacity have to interpret and apply Co=unity law. 
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suffice. Mr. Justice Linde, in his section on "Transportation and State laws 
under the United States' Constitution" - admirable particularly for its 
broad historical approach which for the interested but perhaps only mod-
estly informed European reader is a most excellent introduction - dis-
cusses (at p. 150) the judgment of Chief Justice Taney in the License 
Cases 13 and his well-known if much criticized observation that the States 
may, "for the safety or convenience of trade, or for the protection of the 
health of its citizens, make regulations of commerce of its own ports and 
harbours and for its own territory; and such regulations are valid unless 
they come in conflict with a law of Congress."14 
The parallel is marked between the License Cases, which concerned the 
sale of intoxicating liquor brought from outside the State, and the recent 
decision of the Court of Justice of the European Communities concerning 
the Belgian Loi Vandervelde. 15 Shortly put, the Loi Vandervelde, which was 
introduced at the end of the First World War to combat the widespread 
alcoholism of the day, forbade in Belgium the selling of alcoholic spirits 
(over a certain strength) in any public place for consumption on the prem-
ises. Foreign visitors to Belgium may have been surprised to know that 
such a law continued to exist, but it certainly existed until very recently, and 
a prosecution was challenged on the ground that it infringed the free-move-
ment-of-goods article of the Treaty of Rome. A question designed to re-
solve this problem was submitted by the Court of Appeal at Liege to the 
Court of the Communities. The Court in its judgment preferred not to 
place its reasoning on the protection of health but on the absence of dis-
crimination between imported and home produced goods. "Such a legisla-
tive measure," it said, "has therefore in fact no connexion with the 
importation of the products and for that reason is not of such a nature as to 
impede trade between Member States."16 The end result, however, of the 
.B!esgen case was the same as that in the License Cases. 
Another parallel is to be found in the wide use made in the second half 
of the nineteenth century of the "due process oflaw" provisions of the four-
teenth amendent which, in another case mentioned, was even invoked to 
guarantee the freedom to operate a slaughter house (p. 156). One may com-
pare this with the contention recently presented before the Court of Justice 
that a Community regulation imposing a standstill on fresh planting of 
vineyards - a measure introduced to reduce the total quantity and to im-
prove the quality of Community wine - should be equiparated with expro-
priation and was invalid since it conflicted with a general principle of law, 
unwritten in Community law but found in the law of Member States.17 In 
that case, the Court readily recognized that Community law forbade expro-
priation without compensation and then only in accordance with proper 
legal safeguards but that it was necessary to distinguish between "a possible 
13. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). 
14. 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 579. 
15. See Blesgen v. Belgium, Case 75/81 (E. Comm. Ct. J. Mar. 31, 1981) (transcript avail-
able on LEXIS, Eurcom library, cases file). 
16. Blesgen v. Belgium, Case 75/81, at 60 (LEXIS transcript). 
17. Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3727, (1979-1981 Transfer 
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) f 8629. 
1128 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:1122 
infringement of the right to property and, on the other hand, a possible 
limitation upon the freedom to pursue a trade or profession." 18 The regula• 
tion fell into the latter category and was upheld.19 The judgment in that 
case is a good example of the readiness in an appropriate case of the Court 
of Justice to incorporate as part of Community law principles not expressly 
to be found in any of the constituent treaties. 
In a different field one might cite the evol~tion in the United States of 
the case law on free movement of persons so clearly expounded by Profes• 
sor Rosberg. One is immediately struck by the pertinence to Europe of 
cases which he cites such as Edwards v. California .20 Take the following 
quotation from Mr. Justice Byrnes: "It is frequently the case that a State 
might gain a momentary respite from the pressure of events by the simple 
expedient of shutting its gates to the outside world. But in the words of Mr. 
Justice Cardozo: 'The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a 
political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory 
that the peoples of the several States must sink or swim together, and that in 
the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.' "21 
Was this formulation in the minds of the framer of the Treaty of Rome, 
Article 48 of which says, "[t]he free movement of workers shall be ensured 
within the Community" and which continues to the effect that such free• 
dom of movement "shall involve the abolition of any discrimination based 
on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employ• 
ment, remuneration and other working conditions"?22 Probably not, but 
the concept and spirit informing both statements remains identical. 
Nonetheless the Treaty of Rome provides expressly, Article 48, para• 
graph 4, that the freedom of movement of workers is not to apply to em• 
ployment in the public service.23 This in tum invites comparison with the 
case discussed by Professor Rosberg (p. 329) concerning the existence of 
State power to exclude aliens from public works employment or the State 
Civil Service and which has now been denied by the Supreme Court.24 It is 
interesting to compare the reasoning of the Supreme Court in that case with 
that of the Court of Justice in the relatively recent judgment of the Court 
which declared that Belgium had no right to reserve certain routine and 
relatively menial jobs for its own nationals.25 
CONCLUSION 
Your reviewer is conscious that he has laid too much emphasis on the 
chapters of Courts and Free Markets dealing with the United States. This is 
perhaps inevitable since he approached the volume from the point of view 
18. Hauer, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3745. 
19. Hauer, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3749-50. 
20. 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
21. 314 U.S. at 173-74 (quoting Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935)). 
22. Treaty of Rome, 298 U.N.T.S. at 36. 
23. Id. 
24. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
25. Commission v. Belgium, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3881, (1979-1981 Transfer Binder] 
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 8726. 
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of one seeking to be further instructed in the relevant sectors of United 
States constitutional law. On the other hand, this review will be largely 
read by those in the United States wishing to know more about the law of 
the Communities. Without attempting to single out any particular contri-
bution it can be said with confidence that the European law material is 
clearly, succinctly and perceptively deployed. My only suggestion, and it is 
a minor one, is that while the law of the Communities has but a short his-
tory in its present form there are some antecedents and that it might have 
been helpful to have included a brief resume of earlier attempts to form a 
free market. Not that there are many close parallels, but a brief description 
of the operation of the Zollverein, the Prussian-led customs union of the 
nineteenth century, and some of the earlier attempts in the twentieth cen-
tury to harmonize tariffs (culminating in GATT) might not have been out 
of place. But this is indeed a minor criticism, if criticism at all. 
In short, Courts and Free Markets is an outstanding work to be read 
with profit by readers on both sides of the Atlantic. More than that, the 
several contributions add up to a classic of its kind and I am confident that 
in the years to come it will be a quarry for other writers - with or without 
due acknowledgement. In the field of academic writing there can be no 
higher praise. 
